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ment to limit emissions before 2015. Moreover, emissions
reductions will not be required until 2020 at the earliest. This
''agreement to agree" seems utterly inadequate when viewed
in the stark light of the latest climate science. In 2010, negotiators in Cancin, Mexico, agreed that countries should limit
overall global warming to two degrees Celsius, but there is virtually no chance this goal can be achieved without major action
before 2020. And leading climate scientists now suggest that
letting the earth warm even two degrees Celsius might have catastrophic consequences. See Douglas Fischer, New Perils Seen
to Even Modest Warming, The Daily Climate, Dec. 6, 2011,
available at www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2011/12/warming-caution (quoting James Hansen).
In the face of international stagnation, domestic and bilateral/multilateral carbon emissions reductions efforts are, for the
time being, our best strategy. But federal climate change action
has been meager in the United States, meaning that right now,
our country's best hope may lie with the states. States across
the country have taken up the mantle of setting and achieving measurable progress on climate change. Along with many
commendable efforts to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy occurring across the country, two regions stand out
as aggressively pursuing greenhouse gas mitigation strategies:
the Northeast and the West. In the Northeast, a group of nine
states (previously ten, until New Jersey recently announced its
intention to withdraw) has been operating a regional cap-andtrade market since 2009, known as the "Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative" or "RGGI." In the West, California has recently
adopted a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide and has
launched, in collaboration with several U.S. states and Canadian provinces, the "Western Climate Initiative" or "WCI."
One may question why states would self-impose such
restrictions on their economies, given that individual state
actions will certainly be inadequate to address the collective
action problem posed by climate change. There are several
explanations. First, there may be some advantage to being a
first mover, and, in fact, a recent study of RGGI suggests the
program has boosted participating state economies. RGGI,
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Inc., Investment of Proceeds from RGGI C02 Allowances 5-9
(2011). Both RGGI and WCI members have also explainedthat their hope is ultimately to spur federal action and to serve
as prototypes for a federal scheme.
But going it alone is not ideal for these states. Larger capand-trade markets function more efficiently and have a greater
impact on global emissions. For this reason, as well as likely for
more symbolic reasons, the WCI and RGGI have not limited
their ambitions to domestic cooperation. Each has announced
plans to include Canadian provinces and eventually perhaps
Mexican states.
A state-led cross-border cap-and-trade program, thus, seems
poised to be the United States' first foray into targets-based
international cooperation on climate change. This is arguably
a good example of our federal system at work-environmental
protection, after all, has often been driven by state innovation
that ultimately led to federal action. And neither Congress nor
the federal executive branch has disapproved of the WCI's or
RGGI's expansion plans. However, the type of international
cooperation required by a cross-border cap-and-trade system
may nevertheless overstep constitutional limits on subnational
players venturing into foreign affairs.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 519
(2007), while generally solicitous of states' rights to engage
on climate change, set some obvious boundaries for states:
"Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, [and] it cannot negotiate
an emissions treaty with China or India." Beyond this clear
parameter, however, the bounds of what extraterritorial steps
states can take are murky.
The question of whether a cross-border ROGI or WCI
might overstep these bounds is of more than academic
interest. Because climate change and cap-and-trade are contentious issues in our country, it is likely that either scheme's
efforts to expand will be subject to judicial challenge,
including challenges under the constitutional doctrines of
preemption, the dormant foreign affairs power, the Compact
Clause, or the dormant Commerce Clause. This article examines these four constitutional hurdles that might be raised
against cross-border cap-and-trade and considers whether
the RGGI and WCI programs may surmount them. Several
academic articles have raised the same questions on a theoretical level; this article distills some of the key concerns in
these articles and applies them to the particular collaborative formats that RGGI and the WCI have selected. See,
e.g., Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation
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State, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1621 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 Ariz. L. Rev.
879 (2008). I conclude that although courts might plausibly
read the relevant lines of precedent to invalidate these crossborder cap-and-trade schemes, there are more compelling
reasons to find them constitutionally permissible.

The Design of RGGI and the WCI
RGGI and the WCI have similar structures but are at different stages of implementation and differ on some important
rules. RGGI was established by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed among the participating states in
2005 (a few states signed on later). This MOU establishes a
regional emissions trading market, sets a C02 "budget" for
each participating state and secures each state's commitment
to pursue necessary implementing legislation or regulations.
It also outlines a schedule of reductions from these starting
budgets and sets forth general program rules. A more detailed
explanation of program rules is contained in RGGI's Model
Rule-a draft rule on which states agreed to substantially base
their own independent legislation and regulations. See RGGI,
Model Rule, available at www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20
Revised%2012.31.08.pdf. Additionally, the participating states
have formed a nonprofit corporation, ROGI, Inc., to run an
emissions tracking and reporting system, auction C02 allowances, and provide technical assistance to the states. See
RGGI, Inc., www.rggi.org/rggi. RGGI has been fully operational for three years and is scheduled to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 10 percent from 2009 levels by 2018, although
there is discussion about whether the reduction target should
be increased in light of the Northeast's precipitous decline in
emissions over the past several years.
The critical point about RGGI's structure for present purposes is that although participating states have established an
ongoing administrative body to oversee the trading market, its
state members do not delegate any of their sovereign power to
this body. Nor are participating RGGI states given any powers
they could not exercise in ROGI's absence, and each state is.
free to withdraw at any time.
Although RGOI has several Eastern Canadian provinces
claiming "observer" status-Quabec, New Brunswick, and
Ontario-it has been slow to act on any potential expansion
to Canada. Presumably, any expansion would occur through
an amendment to the MOU to add a Canadian province as a
member of RGGI, along with the province adopting its own
version of the Model Rule.
The WCI has been slower than RGGI to coalesce into a
functional program, but has been more aggressive in its plans
to operate across the U.S.-Canadian border. This eagerness
to look internationally is no doubt driven in part by its waning progress on the domestic front. The WCI began in 2007
as a collaboration among Arizona, California, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Washington and expanded to include Montana and Utah as well as the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Qu6bec. But Arizona formally withdrew from the initiative in late 2011 and most other
states have informally halted their collaboration. California
is now the sole U.S. signatory state moving forward with the
implementation of a greenhouse gas trading program, in collaboration with the participating Canadian provinces.
These remaining participants have announced a form for
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the WCI that is less unified than RGGL Whereas RGGI participants each agreed to base their state regulations on a shared
model rule, the WCI provides design recommendations and
has announced plans to "link" WCI jurisdictions once individual programs are formed. See WCI, Design for the WCI
Regional Program 22 (July 2010). But linkage, which would
occur through "WCI Partner jurisdictions . .. recognizing each
other's allowances for compliance purposes," can only occur
after Partner jurisdictions have "the opportunity to review
each jurisdiction's program to assess its consistency with the
program design." Id. The WCI has also chosen to regulate
more sectors (RGGI regulates only the electricity generation
sector, whereas the WCI will also include major industrial
sources and, eventually, natural gas and fuel suppliers) and
design a more complicated program so as to prevent emissions "leakage." Like RGGI, the WCI recently announced the
creation of 'WCI, Inc.," a nonprofit corporation that will coordinate allowance auctions and track allowances.
The first intra-WCI linkage will almost certainly be between
California and Quebec, which became the first Canadian province to adopt a cap-and-trade program in December 2011, with
compliance required beginning in 2013. Qu6bec's program is
overall quite similar to California's, except that it has adopted
stricter emissions targets: Whereas California's suite of policies
aims to return the state to its 1990 levels of emissions by 2020
and the WCI has set a goal of 15 percent cuts from 2005 levels
by 2020, Quebec calls for reductions of 20 percent below 1990
levels in the same time frame. Compare Cal. Air Res. Board,
Resolution 07-55 (Dec. 6, 2007), with WCI, Design for the
WCI Regional Program I (July 2010), and Philippe TeisceiraLessard, Quebec Goes It Alone with Cap-and-TradeClimate Plan,
The Globe and Mail, Dec. 15, 2011, at A6. This discrepancy
in targets could present a challenge for linking Quebec's and
California's markets, but the WCI announced in January 2012
that it hoped to complete linkage between the two by summer 2012, and California has begun the process of amending
its regulations to make linkage possible. WCI, WCI Emissions Trading ProgramUpdate (Jan. 12, 2012), available at www.
westenclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/Partner-Meeting-Materials/Jan-12-Stakeholder-Update-Presentation/%20;
Cal. Air Res. Bd., DraftAmendments to the CaliforniaCap on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based ComplianceMechanisms to Allow for the Use of Compliance Instruments Issued by
Linked Jurisdictions (Mar. 30, 2012).

Possible Constitutional Challenges: Field
and Conflict Preemption
Adding Canadian provinces to either the WCI or RGGI
would benefit participating states and provinces and would signify progress forward on international climate cooperation. But
these potentially positive consequences cannot save the schemes
from constitutional scrutiny, and several doctrines derived from
the U.S. Constitution may bar these collaborations.
The first constitutionally derived doctrine that might be
raised as a barrier to a cross-border program is conflict or field
preemption-via the Supremacy Clause-by federal policy.
It is also, in my view, the weakest argument against expansion. Field preemption exists only where Congress has spoken
so thoroughly on an issue that it must have meant to occupy
the field. A field preemption argument against a cross-border
cap-and-trade program would have difficulty gaining traction.
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Simply put, there is no comprehensive federal scheme in place
for international climate change policy at the present time.
Conflict preemption presents a more plausible critique, though
still likely an unavailing one. Classically, conflict preemption
invalidates a state policy only where the state policy stands as an
obstacle to accomplishment of a congressional objective. The
conflict preemption doctrine arguably now stretches a bit further
in the foreign affairs context. In 2003, the Supreme Court controversially held, in American InsuranceAssociation v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, that a California law requiring insurers to disclose outstanding Holocaust-era claims was preempted not by any federal
statute but by executive branch policy alone. But even under the
Garamendiversion of conflict preemption, a litigant must point to
some executive branch policy with which the challenged state law
allegedly conflicts.

Even under the Garamendiversion
of conflict preemption, a litigant
must point to some executive branch
policy with which the challenged
state law allegedly conflicts.
A litigant challenging a cross-border cap-and-trade program
might argue that the program conflicts with both Congress'
position and the executive branch's negotiating stance on climate change. Plaintiffs in a few Bush-era cases advanced this
argument in seeking to invalidate aggressive state actions. As
evidence, they pointed to the executive branch's international
negotiating posture and the Senate's rejection of binding emissions reductions in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution-a unanimous
resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), passed in response
to the Kyoto Protocol that declared that the United States
would not adopt binding emissions limitations until developing countries did the same. Courts were not persuaded. In two
cases, Green Mtn. ChryslerPlymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie,
508 E Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) and CentralValley ChryslerJeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 E Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007),
district courts concluded that even during the Bush administration the federal government viewed state actions as an
important part of the overall U.S. climate change strategy.
It is not likely that a different result would be reached
in 2012. The Obama administration has been even more
generous toward state actions. Going into the Durban negotiations, the United States took the position that "the most
effective thing we can do to address climate change is for all
relevant countries to act vigorously at home." See John M.
Broder, At Meeting on Climate Change, Urgent Issues but Low
Expectations, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2011, at A8. And in its
most recent communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States
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applauded efforts such as RGGI, noting that they "serve as
a model for countries that are beginning to formulate their
response to climate change because they can be tailored to
local and regional conditions, are often scalable, and can
create economic opportunities and job growth through the
promotion of clean energy." U.S. Dept. of State, Climate
Action Report 2010: Fifth National Communication of The
United States of America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 61 (2011), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/140636.pdf.
To be sure, cross-border collaboration might threaten a unitary national climate negotiating strategy more than domestic
state actions do, and, thus, an expanded WCI or RGGI might
be more vulnerable to a conflict preemption challenge than
past state actions. In Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000), the Supreme Court made clear that when
a national policy has been set on a matter of foreign affairs,
states cannot take measures that conflict with that policy by
reducing the federal government's "bargaining chip[s]" in terms
of "economic and diplomatic leverage." But by touting state
initiatives and calling for vigorous action at home, the federal
government has to a certain extent negated the argument that
an expanded RGGI or WCI would reduce its bargaining chips
on the international stage. In sum, given the federal government's current position, it may be difficult to convince a court
that a cross-border cap-and-trade program would directly conflict with current U.S. international climate policy.
However, it is a presidential election year, and a new, more
conservative administration would likely be more hostile
toward climate change action. If a new executive position that
explicitly disfavored state-foreign collaborations on climate
were announced, such a policy might, under the precedent set
by Garamendi,preempt an expanded WCI or RGGI. Thus,
while RGGI and the WCI are safe from conflict preemption
for now, they may be in a more tenuous long-term position.

Possible Constitutional Challenges:
Interference in Foreign Affairs and
Commerce
Other doctrines that might be raised against a cross-border
cap-and-trade scheme are more persuasive, and all implicate similar concerns. The first of these is dormant foreign
affairs preemption. Zschernigv. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968),
is the leading case establishing this form of preemption, and,
indeed, the only case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a state law on this ground. In Zschernig, the Court struck
down an Oregon probate statute prohibiting inheritance by a
nonresident alien unless certain conditions were met by the
alien's home country, finding because the policy had a "direct
impact on foreign relations" it was forbidden by the Constitution, which "entrusts [such matters] solely to the Federal
Government." Notably, the Zschemig majority did not think it
necessary for the federal government to have taken any action
in the subject area of the state law in order for the state law to
be preempted. This strong stance has the potential for innumerable applications if read broadly, and whether its reasoning
still obtains is debatable. In its 2003 Garamendi decision, the
Supreme Court majority discussed Zschernig, but did not rest its
decision on its logic (finding conflict preemption instead). Justice's Ginsburg's dissent pointed out that the Supreme Court
"ha[s] not relied on Zschernig since it was decided."
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Garamendi's discussion of Zschernig did, however, create
uncertainty about its possible resurrection. If dormant foreign
affairs preemption were raised against cross-border cap-andtrade, a court would have considerable leeway in deciding
how broadly to construe the doctrine. Justice Ginsburg reads
Zschernig as applying only when "a state action reflects a state
policy critical of foreign governments and involves sitting
in judgment on them." Alternatively, some courts focus on
Zschernig's statement that a state law cannot stand when it "has
a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely
affect the power of the central government to deal with those
problems." The issue of how a cross-border WCI or RGGI
might fare under these two enumerations of the Zschernig test
is considered below.
A cross-border scheme could also be challenged under the
Compact Clause, which prohibits states from entering "into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power" without the consent of Congress. U.S. Const., art.
1, § 10. Despite the "any" language cited above, not all compacts are, in fact, prohibited. At least for state-state compacts,
the critical question, as formulated by the Supreme Court in
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452
(1978), is whether the agreement is "directed to the formation
of any combination tending to the increase of political power
in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States." Under this test, the
domestic versions of RGGI and the WCI are generally thought
capable of withstanding a Compact Clause challenge because,
as described above, they do not delegate any sovereign authority to ROGI, Inc., or WCI, Inc., and states retain the power to
withdraw at any time.
The Compact Clause may, however, be more strictly
applied in the case of state-province compacts. Because of
the foreign affairs concerns potentially implicated, Supreme
Court precedent suggests that "certain additional protections apply to foreign compacts." Edward T. Swaine, Does
Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
403, 506-09 (2003). What these protections might be is
unclear-no foreign compact has yet been struck on these
grounds. Presumably, the analysis would be similar to the one
applied under the dormant foreign affairs power, as any additional concerns raised by a foreign compact would revolve
around the impacts it might have on the federal government's foreign affairs powers.
Another basis for a cross-border cap-and-trade challenge is
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. Just as the Commerce
Clause has been read to prevent states from discriminating
against or placing undue burdens on other states' commerce,
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause imposes limits on
states' ability to interfere in foreign commerce. In Japan Line,
Ltd. v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the Supreme
Court struck down a state's imposition of ad valorem taxes on
shipping containers of a foreign corporation whose home government (Japan) imposed similar taxes, reasoning that the
state tax resulted in double taxation and impeded the federal
government's ability to speak with "one voice" in regulating
foreign trade. While multiple taxation is not likely to be an
issue in the case of an expanded WCI or RGGI, the broader
"one voice" test may well be. Although this test has been
relaxed in the years since Japan Line, for example, in Barclays Bank PLC v. FranchiseTax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994),
where the Supreme Court indicated that it will not necessarily
NR&E Summer 2012

invalidate state policies that have even tacit congressional
approval, Congress has not signaled such tacit approval in the
case of cross-border state-level cap-and-trade programs.
The "one voice" prong of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause does not, however, raise unique concerns for cross-border cap-and-trade's validity. Instead, it implicates issues similar
to those raised by dormant foreign affairs preemption and the
foreign Compact Clause, although the latter two doctrines
center more on matters of diplomacy than commerce. The
final section of this article offers some thoughts on why courts
should allow an expanded WCI or RGGI to survive under all
of these doctrines.

Letting State Dynamism Flourish
At their core, inquiries under dormant foreign affairs preemption, the dormant foreign Commerce Clause, and the
Compact Clause all focus on whether an expanded RGGI or
WCI would impede the federal government's ability to act
internationally on climate change and, thereby, in the language of Japan Line, "frustrat[e] the attainment of federal
uniformity," or give states undue power by allowing them, to
use Justice Ginsburg's words in Garamendi, to "sit in judgment"
of foreign states.

Given the federal government's
current position, it may be difficult
to convince a court that a crossborder cap-and-trade program
would directly conflict with current
U.S. international climate policy.

A court sympathetic to the constitutional challenges presented by an expanded RGGI or WCI probably could find
reason enough to invalidate the schemes. For one, RGGI and
the WCI have some unabashed foreign affairs-related ambitions. Although certainly motivated in part by the disastrous
effects climate change might have upon their own lands and
citizens, the WCI and RGGI states are also motivated to
expand because they hope it will spur federal and international
action. This alone might be enough to fail a capacious interpretation of Zschernig that would bar state action with "a direct
impact upon foreign relations."
An expanded RGGI or WCI might also fail under a "federal
uniformity" or "one voice" theory. Although there is no current federal hard-line strategy, such as "promise no domestic
progress until like promises are exacted from the other major
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emitters," an expanded cap-and-trade program would diminish the federal government's ability to take this stance in the
future. An expanded program, therefore, might be considered
state action on climate change that, as phrased in Zschernig,
"adversely affect[s] the power of the central government to
deal with those problems."
Similarly, if the question is whether an expanded RGGI
or WCI would allow states to "sit in judgment," the answer
might be yes. The WCI's design requires linking jurisdictions
to assess each other's programs for compliance with program
design. And RGGI states would have to ensure that a province's adopted version of the model rule comported with
existing versions. But in my opinion, to consider this review
tantamount to "sitting in judgment" would overinflate the
states' role in RGGI and WCI review. Any province linked
through the WCI or joining RGGI would have precommitted
itself, by signing on, to attempting to design a scheme that
conforms to program rules. State review is simply to ensure
compliance with what the parties have already agreed upon,
not to impose an independent judgment of what the state
views as right or wrong.

At their core, inquiries under
dormant foreign affairs preemption,
the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause, and the Compact Clause
all focus on whether an expanded
RGGI or WCI would impede the
federal government's ability to act
internationally on climate change.

I believe that the better way to view an expanded WCI
or RGGI would be as a dynamic and commendable attempt
by states to solve a new problem-in other words, as a representation of what's best in our federalist system. To be sure,
these programs push the boundaries of past state experimentation. But they represent efforts quite different from those
that are typically invalidated under the dormant foreign Commerce Clause or dormant foreign affairs preemption. These are
not efforts to exact something from a foreign state, or to condemn a foreign state's actions, or to enlarge state power. To
the contrary, these are collaborative efforts that bring together
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innovators from the United States and Canada to improve
upon both countries' efforts. Far from being critical of foreign
states, a cross-border RGGI or WCI would celebrate the efforts
occurring on each side of the border.
It is also important to keep in mind that the constitutional
doctrines discussed above are "judicially created federalism
doctrines derived from the structure of the Constitution, not
its explicit language." David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to
Global Warming: Is It Constitutionalto Think Globally and Act
Locally?, 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 53, 67 (2003). The Compact
Clause, as a textual restraint, might be viewed as an exception to this statement, but expanding it to impose additional
requirements for foreign compacts would be a judicial determination as well. While the judicial precedents establishing
these doctrines cannot be ignored, courts might rightly hesitate to extend them to RGGI or the WCI, particularly given
the apparent lack of federal concern over these schemes.
Unlike in past cases where a foreign state or the national government has expressly denounced certain state actions, there
is no indication that an expanded WCI or RGGI would have
any negative effect on foreign affairs. To the contrary, the current federal silence on RGGI's and the WCI's expansion plans
may indicate a national view that a cross-border scheme would
positively affect the federal government's negotiating power by
acting as a prototype for future international collaborations
and demonstrating serious U.S. progress. Even if the lack of
federal comment on these schemes represents mere disinterest,
it would still appear that there is no concern that the schemes
are interfering with the national climate negotiating strategy.
There are also practical reasons to uphold these schemes as
constitutional. Climate change may represent the most massive collective action problem the world has ever faced, not
only because of its scale, but because it implicates issues of
equity and blame, historical contributions and future ones, and
unevenly and unfairly distributed impacts. These intractable
difficulties have led to an international standoff, with the
United States and Canada unwilling to proceed without securing firm commitments from major developing country emitters.
It would only be logical for subnational actors to hesitate to
act on their own as well because they have even less ability to
impact worldwide emissions. But despite having no guarantees
that much will be gained from forging ahead, the RGGI and
WCI states and provinces have proven themselves willing to
undertake firm greenhouse gas reduction commitments. Knowing that they are not moving forward completely alone,
though, is important for these subnational actors. Allowing
cross-border collaboration enhances each scheme's chances of
success and each participant's willingness to undertake rigorous
targets. Given how challenging international, or even
national, progress on climate change has been, a court would
be wise to take a "frankly instrumentalist" approach to the
question of whether RGGI and the WCI are constitutionally
permissible, allowing the regimes to proceed so long as they do
not obviously impair the interests of national unity. See Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate
Regulation: Unitary v. PluralArchitectures, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 681,
693 (2008). Right now, these state-province collaborations are
fostering the only firm emissions reduction targets and trading
markets in North America. And two degrees of global warming are getting ever closer. S
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